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ABSTRACT 
 
ROSS MICHAEL TWELE:  The So-Called „Union‟ of Corinth and Argos and the Nature 
of the πόιηο  
(Under the direction of Fred Naiden) 
 
This thesis revisits the political interactions between Corinth and Argos during the 
Corinthian War (392-386), commonly referred to by modern scholars as a unification 
between two πόιεηο.  It re-examines the various source traditions and argues that no 
unification program of the sort attested in later Greek history ever occurred.  Argos‟ 
involvement in Corinthian affairs was limited by Spartan interference to a merely 
territorial and military presence in the Corinthia, and the Argive leadership of the 
Isthmian Games of 390 was more closely connected to previous tensions over pan-
Hellenic contests than to a sharing of political rights.  It also uses this event to evaluate 
aspects of the theoretical and systematic model of the πόιηο advanced by M. H. Hansen 
and the Copenhagen Polis Centre. An anomaly like the „Union‟ does not fit into this 
formulation, and only a more fluid understanding of the nature of the πόιηο can 
accommodate it.  
iv 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION: A POLITICAL ABERRATION ..........................................................1 
A(NOTHER) RECONSTRUCTION OF THE UNION ......................................................6 
ἀθαληδνκέλελ ηὴλ πόιηλ ............................................................................................................. 9 
The Union in its first year ....................................................................................................... 10 
The assault on the Peiraion ..................................................................................................... 16 
The Isthmian Games ................................................................................................................ 21 
The Peace of Antalkidas ......................................................................................................... 31 
Which account do we prefer? ................................................................................................. 35 
THE UNION AND THE NATURE OF THE πόιηο ..........................................................39 
CONCLUSION:  ARGOS, CORINTH, AND THE ABSTRACT πόιηο ..........................47 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: A POLITICAL ABERRATION 
 In 392, a political revolution broke out in Corinth.  It occurred in the midst of a 
war between Sparta and an alliance of politically mismatched πόιεηο running the gamut 
from fiercely democratic Argos to ancestrally oligarchic Corinth.  In this revolution, the 
Corinthian aristocratic leadership was massacred, and all remaining influential 
sympathizers withdrew into exile.  The victorious democratic faction found itself in 
desperate need for support from another large and more stable πόιηο, and it put out feelers 
to both Athens and Argos.  Argos, being closer to Corinth and more interested in the 
stability of the anti-Spartan alliance, responded. 
 What followed was a unique occurrence in classical Greek political history, a 
problem still to be solved by modern ancient historians.  Simply put: Argos absorbed 
Corinth.  On what grounds, with what motivation, to what end, by what means, to what 
extent, over what time span, and with what support from the Corinthians still at home – 
all of these aspects have been analyzed and re-analyzed, bandied about between 
commentators over the past sixty years.  Many of these studies have located the Union of 
Corinth and Argos within a framework of anti-Spartan strategy; others have attempted to 
isolate an attested political arrangement that can be co-opted for this event; still others 
have used it as a vehicle for testing the comparative reliability of its ancient chroniclers.
1
 
                                                          
1
 The responses these scholars have produced are as numerous as the routes they have taken to get there.  
Grote 1854 saw it as a political union held together by Argive garrisons; Bury 1913 and Beloch 1922 added 
to the picture the concept of integration of political rights.  Griffith 1950, still regarded as the touchstone 
for all subsequent dialogue on the Union, introduced the proposition that the Union was a form of 
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 This thesis considers the Union from a different approach.  The past fifteen years 
have seen a resurgence of the debate over what concepts and identities the Greeks had in 
mind when they wrote of the πόιηο.  To the average Greek of the fifth and fourth 
centuries B.C., the πόιηο was undoubtedly the single most formative influence on his 
identity.  Its name determined his citizenship; its territory enclosed his livelihood; its 
governing institutions dictated his political privileges, its class structure imparted his 
social order, and its cult activity shaped his disposition towards his patron gods.  But 
what, in practical terms, did the πόιηο define?   
M. H. Hansen and his Copenhagen Polis Centre took on the mission of examining 
all ancient attestations of the word πόιηο to construct a framework of concepts and 
meanings that the Greeks of the Archaic and Classical periods attributed to the word.  
Over fourteen years, the CPC published a series of volumes detailing not only the results 
of the investigation, but extensive catalogues of the various uses of πόιηο in each of the 
major authors and at different stages of Greek history.  Its findings have been intensely 
scrutinized, in no small part because of its own intellectual underpinning that lexical and 
semantic studies, producing lists and schemata of shades of meaning, can satisfactorily 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ἰζνπνιηηεία (though emphatically not of the Hellenistic type) that developed in two distinct stages.  In his 
camp are Thompson 1972, Di Gioia 1974 (who liberated Corinth within the framework of the Union to 
nearly full political αὐηνλνκία), Hamilton 1979, Whitby 1984, to some extent Salmon 1984 (who is more 
concerned about Corinthian voluntarism in the affair than the affair itself), Bearzot 2004, and Sordi 2006.  
Against Griffith et alia stand Accame 1951, who settles on a ζπλνηθηζκóο, followed closely though 
independently by Kagan 1962; Tomlinson 1972, who argued for a federation with social and political 
reciprocity; Tuplin 1982 and 1992, who rejected both ἰζνπνιηηεία and the two-stage development but 
offered nothing in its place; and Fornís 2009, who invoked the confusion of the entire debate and the 
inherent prejudices of the sources to deconstruct the wigwam and argue that, in fact, no such Union ever 
existed at all.  The standard works on Greek federations (Larsen 1968) and ἰζνπνιηηεία (Gawantka 1975) 
both fail to mention the Union at all.  Most current textbooks, distantly connected monographs, and general 
treatments (including Missiou 1992 and Edwards 1995 on Andokides, Shipley 1997 on Plutarch‟s 
Agesilaos, and my own personal research experiences) are content to call it a political and territorial union 
and leave it there. 
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explain the ancient Greek understanding of the political concept called by the term 
πόιηο.2 
Simply put again: the Union of Corinth and Argos defies all of the CPC‟s 
prodigious – and prolific – schematic explications of the πόιηο.  One πόιηο asserted 
control over another, but the other retained its πόιηο-ness.  Territorial amalgamation was 
nearly immediate; social and religious assimilation followed shortly thereafter; political 
unification was anticipated by one πόιηο, perhaps by both.  The πνιίηηθνη of one πόιηο 
were at odds with each other, and the expatriated side summoned Sparta to dissolve the 
Union by force; the plot failed.  Through it all, Argos retained an Argive identity and 
Corinth retained some form of Corinthian identity, and yet the two πόιεηο were one πόιηο 
– but, by some accounts, still two πόιεηο!  And all resistance to the Union (as our sources 
preserve it) was based on wartime strategy and power politics – not, apparently, on any 
complaint about the un-Greek-ness of the Union or the reinterpretation of the meaning of 
πόιηο.  In other words, as far as the Greeks were concerned, this singular, bizarre 
experiment was not particularly un-πόιηο-like. 
How can this Union, then, be accommodated by the CPC formulation of the 
nature of the πόιηο?  To solve this problem, we must first make our own foray into the 
problem of the nature of the Union itself.  In doing so, we face the fundamental obstacle 
that has made the Union such a point of debate in the first place: the nature of the source 
material.  Our only substantial account is Xenophon‟s in the Hellenika, a work that 
                                                          
2
 Unsurprisingly, most discussions of the nature of the πόιηο take their cues from the Athenian experience, 
with the Spartan and Theban/Boiotian forms of πνιηηεία as correctives or as supplements to the otherwise 
Athenocentric field.  If we are to verify Hansen‟s theories as applied to Greek πόιεηο as a whole group, we 
must look to instances in Greek history when the existence of a πόιηο changes in such a way as to be 
historically noteworthy, and attempt to extrapolate information about the meaning of the concept πόιηο and 
interpolate this new information into Hansen‟s framework.  The Union of Corinth and Argos fits this need 
well. 
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frames the entire Corinthian War as a contest between Sparta and Athens for pan-
Hellenic legitimacy, and consequently relegates all activity among the other πόιεηο to a 
secondary position.  There is not enough in Xenophon to construct a sustained narrative 
of the Union from its inception in 392 to its dissolution by the Peace of Antalkidas in 
386; in fact, we can only speak with any authority on its first two years.   
Our other sources do not fill any chronological gaps, nor are they precisely 
historical works.  We have a speech by Andokides encouraging the Athenians to make 
peace with Sparta in early 391, invoking Argos‟ aspirations for Corinth only as a weight 
in the scales of the larger debate, and we have both Xenophon‟s and Plutarch‟s 
biographies of the Spartan king Agesilaos, which refer to the Union only insofar as their 
protagonist was involved – again, only the first two years.  There is Diodoros, who 
provides the only comparable narrative of the war apart from the Hellenika; but his 
account sets the conception of the Union at precisely the point where all of our other 
sources indicate its second birthday.
3
  There are questions of proximity to the event 
(Andokides‟ and Xenophon‟s contemporaneity v. Diodoros‟ and Plutarch‟s distance of 
350-500 years), of bias (Andokides‟ and Xenophon‟s attested oligarchic sympathies v. 
Diodoros‟ and Plutarch‟s sustained political disinterest), and of reliability (Andokides‟ 
oratorical aims v. Xenophon‟s narrative argument v. Plutarch‟s moralizing focus v. 
Diodoros‟ want of intellectual rigor). 
                                                          
3
 An account Griffith 1950 could have pointed to as further evidence for his two-stage theory (though he 
chose not to press Diodoros‟ testimony into his argument) and explained away by Tuplin 1982 (83, in the 
same way that he criticized Griffith for trying to explain away inconsistencies in Xenophon) as a 
misreading of Ephoros.  Striking though their mutual discarding of Diodoros for wholly different purposes 
is, both almost certainly have the right idea about Diodoros in taking his testimony at rather less than face 
value.  Whitby 1984 accepts it at face value, but only insofar as he had already deconstructed Tuplin‟s 
arguments against Diodoros that were founded on arguments in favor of Xenophon and Andokides.  In 
other words, Whitby does not defend Diodoros‟ account, but employs it simply because nothing else is left. 
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We must decide which tradition to accept before we can pass judgment on the 
Union, and yet we cannot pass judgment on the traditions without considering their 
presentations of the Union in the process.  This paper will give answers to both questions, 
examining each aspect of the Union in turn, source by source and issue by issue.  We 
have of course consulted the commentators of the past sixty years in the course of this 
analysis, but we must remember that we are asking a different set of questions than they 
were.  They looked for labels and indictments on the sources; we explicitly look for 
neither.  We seek only an understanding of the problems of the Union and of the political 
theory at stake in it. What was the Union of Corinth and Argos?  And, insofar as the 
context of the previous question allows, what was the πόιηο? 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
A(NOTHER) RECONSTRUCTION OF THE UNION 
 The only way to determine into what sort of union Argos and Corinth entered will 
be to plot out the „facts‟ about the Union preserved by our ancient sources and examine 
the merits and the implications of each.  We begin where we must: with Xenophon, who 
provides the most complete passage we have in any ancient source concerning the visible 
effects of the new Argive involvement in Corinthian political affairs.  It is also the 
passage that has suffered most at the hands of scholars seeking to confirm or deny, to 
various degrees, the accuracy of this account and the honesty either of Xenophon or of 
his own sources, who have most often been associated with the oligarchs who survived 
the Revolution of 392, suffering only exile.  After establishing the flavor of the exiles‟ 
response to the situation at Corinth with ὁξ῵ληεο δὲ ηνὺο ηπξαλλεύνληαο, a formulation 
that does not exactly suggest that this report is sine ira et studio, Xenophon provides a 
catalogue of these visible effects, which follows here, organized on the author‟s own 
syntactic terms:
4
 
 
 αἰζζαλόκελνη δὲ ἀθαληδνκέλελ ηὴλ πόιηλ – perceiving that the πόιηο was 
disappearing 
o ηὸ ὅξνπο ἀλαζπᾶζζαη – the boundary stones being pulled up 
o Ἄξγνο ἀληὶ Κνξίλζνπ ηὴλ παηξίδα αὐηνῖο ὀλνκάδεζζαη – their homeland 
being called Argos instead of Corinth 
 πνιηηείαο ἀλαγθαδόκελνη ηῆο ἐλ Ἄξγεη κεηέρεηλ – being compelled to share in the 
πνιηηεία in Argos (ἧο νὐδὲλ ἐδένλην, which they did not want/need? at all) 
 ἐλ ηῇ πόιεη κεηνίθωλ ἔιαηηνλ δπλάκελνη – having less capacity to wield influence 
in the πόιηο than metics [had] 
                                                          
4
 Hellenika 4.4.6. 
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These are represented by Xenophon as the views of those Corinthians who had fled to the 
Acrocorinth during the massacre, fled the Corinthia intending to go into exile, and were 
wooed back by the appeals of their families and promises from „those in power‟ that they 
would „suffer nothing difficult‟ – i.e., that they would not be prosecuted or persecuted 
upon their return.
5
  By „those in power‟ Xenophon is referring to the leaders of the 
Revolution, who based on his own account must include representatives of all of the 
parties who had organized the massacre: „the Argives; the Athenians; the Boiotians; those 
Corinthians who had accepted money from the Great King; those most responsible for the 
war.‟6  If all were present – or even if one of the non-Corinthian groups were – these 
returnees would have had good reason to look at Corinth as a πόιηο under foreign 
occupation. 
The implications of this situation are subtle.  If these are indeed the men who held 
these opinions, we would be justified in expecting them to feel twinges of nostalgia for 
the Corinth that had existed before a new regime gave them cause to fear for their lives.  
Their return to their homeland would have been riddled through with hesitancy and 
doubt, particularly over the extent to which they could trust the revolutionaries inviting 
them home; they would have found the non-Corinthians among them, as μέλνη and 
representatives of very different political organizations, especially dubious.  All the same, 
                                                          
5
 Hellenika 4.4.5.  By both Xenophon‟s arrangement of material and the most reasonable assumptions 
about the chronology, we are placed firmly in the near aftermath of the Revolution.  This is only to suggest 
that Xenophon is not transposing the entire circumstantial milieu of the returnees‟ experience of the new 
Corinth.  Griffith 1950 missed the propagandistic element that lies behind this passage (243); but others 
may have overplayed it.  All propaganda must begin with a kernel of truth. 
 
6
 Hellenika 4.4.2.  Whether or not „those responsible for the war‟ is syntactically linked to „those of the 
Corinthians who had accepted money from the Great King‟ is at this moment irrelevant; since the war 
began as an alliance against Sparta, representatives of any and all of these groups could easily be held 
„responsible.‟ 
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the promises of security they had received would have given them a modicum of 
optimism – if not for the future of their homeland, then at least for their own.7 
Under these circumstances, then, what are we to make of those of the returnees 
who, as Xenophon tells it, thought it „a worthy enterprise‟ and „most worthy of praise‟ to 
make an attempt to take Corinth back from the revolutionaries?
8
  At the very least, these 
men were making poor repayment for the amnesty they had received from the new men 
ἐλ δπλάκεη and imposing new strife on a πόιηο already devastated by ζηάζηο and πόιεκνο.  
We cannot hypothesize whether they already intended to re-open ζηάζηο at the time when 
the invitation was extended to them to return, but the offer of security surely emboldened 
them for the enterprise. 
Now for the visible effects.  They come in three parts: the disappearance of the 
πόιηο, the compulsion to participate in Argive πνιηηεία, and their level of influence vis-à-
vis the rest of the population of the Corinthia.  All three of these are framed with middle 
present participles, i.e., as events still in motion, which at least keeps Xenophon‟s 
presentation of events self-consistent and suggests that whatever unification was being 
undertaken could not yet be called completed.  The accusations themselves unfortunately 
did not leave archaeological remains (as boundary stones never do) or literary trails (as a 
change of name for a πόιηο ought to have done: more below), so we must do the best we 
can with what records we have. 
                                                          
7
 Why were these supporters of the old Corinthian πνιηηεία (qua arrangement of political institutions) 
invited back at all?  Presumably because Corinth needed men, both to repopulate following the massacre 
and to provide candidates for leadership from the ranks of those who were already well-known and 
respected in Corinthian affairs.  These were certainly not men who were already personae non gratae in 
Corinth, which made their later assault on the new Corinthian πνιηηεία even more disheartening to the rest 
of the Corinthians ἐλ ηῇ πόιεη. 
 
8
 Hellenika 4.4.6; „ἄμηνλ εἶλαη‟ and „ἀμηεπαηλνηάηεο.‟ 
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ἀφανιζομένην τὴν πόλιν 
Concerning the disappearance of the πόιηο, Xenophon preserves charges 
concerning the removal of boundary stones and the change of name.  In order: where 
would these boundary stones have lain? Or, more broadly, where, and how long, was the 
frontier between the Corinthia and the Argolid?  In fact, it was pretty narrow – only about 
6-10 kilometers, according to the most recent estimates.
9
  The topography of the frontier 
is mountainous, 900-1100m above sea level, and only one major road links the two 
territories, passing through Tenea before entering the highlands and descending into the 
Argolid peninsula.
10
  The territory of Kleonai shares a longer border with the Argolid – 
perhaps twice as long or a little more than that of the Corinthia with the Argolid, with 
another connecting road – but there is no indication in any of the sources that Kleonai 
was ever involved in the Union, even as a buffer state. 
The removal of boundary stones, then, is by no means a physically improbable 
occurrence.  One band of soldiers could traverse the ten kilometers (at most) of highlands 
and remove the markers in a matter of days, if that long.  The region itself was largely 
uninhabited (at least in any organized manner) beyond Tenea, so the Argives would have 
met with no local resistance.  The business would have been brief. 
But did it matter?  If it happened, the psychological effect on the residents of the 
Corinthia would have been striking; but what would it mean in any tangible sense?  The 
                                                          
9
 For this, see Sakellariou 1971, 2-6 and figs. 8-10.  The suggestions concerning territorial boundaries 
appear to have been made based on the natural contours of the land rather than on any material evidence, 
which indeed is non-existent: no boundary stones remain.  Sakellariou does not provide boundary lengths, 
apart from the estimate of 6-10 km; all further numbers are my estimates based on the figures provided. 
 
10
 Ibid., fig. 9. 
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fact that there were no border settlements indicates that no one would have immediately 
noticed any political changes, and unless we are to accuse Xenophon of ignoring (or 
suppressing) a major struggle along Argos‟ path to the settlement of Corinth, the Argives 
did not have to contend seriously with the Kleonaians, or even with the Teneans, as their 
garrison forces passed through the Corinthia.   
This lack of conflict may simply indicate a lack of organization and concerted 
effort among the residents of the Corinthia, but it may imply something else.  Suppose 
the boundary stones were uprooted, as Xenophon records: does that imply by necessity 
that Argos ever took control of Corinthian territory, or that it did so immediately the 
stones were removed?  Or could this removal have been essentially ceremonial (since 
there were no communities to be directly affected by the change), and the message it sent 
stronger than Argos‟ ability to enforce its new dominance? 
 
The Union in its first year 
We can use both Andokides and Xenophon for evidence on these points, both of 
whom were active during these events and can shed contemporary light on the issues.  
But these questions refer to the broader themes of the purview of the word πόιηο and the 
elements of statehood that it does and does not cover.  We cannot answer these questions 
until we have examined each author‟s narrative and come to a conclusion about the 
interpretation of the Union that each preserves. 
Since Andokides‟ speech predated most of the events Xenophon describes, we 
should begin with his observations.  Unfortunately for us, Andokides as an orator, unlike 
Xenophon as an author, had the liberty to assume that his audience was well aware of the 
11 
 
situation at the time.  The best we can do here is to construct a framework within which 
the comments Andokides does make comfortably fit. 
This is not a simple task, not least because for Andokides‟ purposes, Corinth was 
less important as a πόιηο with its own problems to be addressed than as a tool – or a 
weapon – to be used by the alliance against Sparta.  The Corinthians (of either group) 
have apparently not sent an embassy to Athens asking for assistance since the Revolution 
and the first Argive steps toward unification, and Andokides frames his argument as a 
response to an Argive request for Athenian assistance.
11
  For what, we cannot be sure; but 
Andokides‟ close juxtaposition of the request with the need to deliberate „about Corinth‟ 
suggests that the Argives wanted Athenian assistance in securing Corinth.  But to what 
purpose?  For Andokides, Corinth‟s only usefulness was as another element in the 
alliance against Sparta – and not a particularly powerful element.  Certainly not at the 
level of the Boiotians, with whose allied power, Athens apparently thought, the anti-
Spartan league would have sufficient force to withstand assault by any rival.  
Unfortunately for Athens, the Boiotian Confederation had already entered into peace 
talks with Sparta by the time of Andokides‟ speech, and should Athens have decided to 
persist in the war it would have lost its single most powerful supplementary force – 
probably a larger force than Athens itself could muster so soon after the Dekeleian War. 
Athens, then, should have been scrambling for any other support it could get, and 
Corinth, as an early rallying point for the anti-Spartan alliance, might have looked worth 
saving for the sake of continued unity among other League members, if for nothing else.  
But Andokides does not see even this much worth in Corinth: if the Boiotians do make 
                                                          
11
 Andokides, De pace 24. 
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peace, he asks, „ηίλνο ἐζηὶλ ἡκῖλ ἀμία Κόξηλζνο‟?12  And his answer indicates that both 
protection of Corinth and the added alliance of Argos would begin to fill the gap left by 
the Boiotian defection, and that only in combination.
13
  We can glean from these 
comments that Corinth had become completely incapable of providing any military might 
to the alliance.  The combination of several years of war, a democratic revolution, and the 
subsequent Argive entrance into Corinthian affairs had deprived Corinth of any 
independent scope for action.  Its „protection‟ might have been beneficial to the alliance‟s 
self-image, but more probably Corinth‟s only continued value to the alliance was as a 
buffer between Sparta and Athens, friendly to the alliance and conveniently situated to 
block Sparta from entering the Isthmus to march against Athens.  It appears that Argos 
understood this and exploited Athens‟ dilemma by making Athens‟ assistance in securing 
Corinth under Argive control a prerequisite for Argos‟ agreement to enter into the 
alliance.  At this early stage, clearly, Argive influence in Corinth was shaky and not yet 
pursued far enough for Argos to be able to handle the task out of its own resources.
14
 
Allying with Argos, Andokides argued, would have locked Athens into making a 
decision about whether it would match forces with Sparta should Sparta attack Argos.  
And what would the stakes of that confrontation be, at least in connection with Argos as 
the battleground?  „In being defeated,‟ he declares, „we will lose our home territory 
                                                          
12
 Ibid. 
 
13
 Ibid. 25. 
 
14
 Griffith 1950 read this passage even more hesitantly, representing Argos as not having executed any 
imperialistic stage of the Union at all by the time of Andokides‟ speech (245).  Griffith discussed the Union 
as if „imperialism‟ encompassed territorial, political, military, and social concerns all at once; we consider 
them distinct enough not to be by necessity simultaneous.  By the time of De pace, military imperialism 
likely had already begun, and social imperialism had begun from the moment of the Corinthian revolution 
and the first invitations for help. 
 
13 
 
(ρώξαλ) along with that of the Corinthians, and in being victorious, we will make the 
Corinthians‟ territory the Argives‟ (ηὴλ Κνξηλζίωλ Ἀξγείωλ πνηήζωκελ).‟15  The 
discussion is entirely territorial.  There is no indication here of any political arrangements 
at stake between Argos and Corinth; the least we can say about this is that, if such 
arrangements were brewing, Andokides and the Athenians had so little interest in them as 
to ignore them completely.  But our suggestion that no such issue had been raised is 
supported by the Argives‟ own communications with Athens concerning the alliance.  
„They request that we make war in union with them and with the Corinthians (θνηλῇ κεηὰ 
ζθ῵λ θαὶ κεηὰ Κνξηλζίωλ),‟ as Andokides presents it, „but they, making peace on their 
own, are not making their territory (ηὴλ ρώξαλ) available to make war with.‟16  The most 
reasonable interpretation of this line is that ηὴλ ρώξαλ refers to the Argives‟ own 
territory, over which they have entertained the beginnings of peace talks with Sparta, and 
that neither the Corinthians nor the Corinthia are connected to Argos in any symbiotic or 
synchronized way.  At the beginning of 391, it looks like Argos and Corinth were not 
only still political units unique from each other, but also territorially separate from each 
                                                          
15
 Ibid. 26.  Tuplin 1982 argues that this statement „is chosen not to suggest that Corinthian territory is not 
yet Argive but to underline the futility of Athens‟ continued participation in the war‟ (79).  The correct 
interpretation, of course, is somewhere in the middle: Corinthian territory is indeed not yet entirely Argive, 
but Athenian involvement in the war if successful would quickly make it so, and Athens must now choose 
whether it can accept that condition.  Tuplin‟s characterization of „Argive possession of Corinth‟ as an 
„undesirable status quo‟ may or may not be read into the speech (see the counterpoint by Whitby 1984, 303 
arguing that Corinthian territory was merely an „object‟ of interest to Athens in the war): it fits Andokides‟ 
personal leanings, but does not in fact constitute a concrete element of his argument to the Athenians. 
 
16
 Ibid. 27.  Tuplin 1982‟s long linguistic commentary on elements of this section concerning whether 
Argos viewed itself as already holding Corinth or not (80-82) amount to little more than grammatical 
fireworks that look remarkably shaky when viewed in toto, as Whitby 1984 shrewdly pointed  out (303-
305); he comes to the conclusion that there is no need for the passage to be interpreted as looking forward 
to the future, as it can be read in the other direction as well.  Again, the actual answer is transitive, and 
Tuplin‟s effort to force Andokides to fit Xenophon precisely sacrifices nuance in the process. 
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other to the point that the former could not and did not claim any authority over the 
territory of the latter. 
Did they want to do so?  Here we come to the trickiest statement Andokides 
makes about the relationship between Argos and Corinth: 
λῦλ νὖλ ηνῦην ὑπόινηπόλ ἐζηηλ ἡκῖλ, πόιεκνλ κὲλ ἑιέζζαη θαὶ λῦλ ἀλη᾽ εἰξήλεο, 
ηὴλ δὲ ζπκκαρίαλ ηὴλ Ἀξγείωλ ἀληὶ ηῆο Βνηωη῵λ, Κνξηλζίωλ δὲ ηνὺο λῦλ ἔρνληαο 
ηὴλ πόιηλ ἀληὶ Λαθεδαηκνλίωλ. 
 
So now this is the remaining point for us: to choose war again now instead of peace, or [to choose] 
alliance with the Argives instead of with the Boiotians, or [to choose] those now holding the πόιηο 
of the Corinthians instead of the Lakedaimonians.
17
 
 
Who is „now holding the πόιηο of the Corinthians‟?  Could it be the Argives?  But the 
context of these juxtapositions would then require that the Boiotians were holding Sparta, 
which is patently ridiculous.  Can it be argued that Andokides considered the Boiotians to 
have become no different from the Spartans by making peace with them?  Perhaps; but 
the Argives had been no better to the alliance, and were also in the process of making 
peace terms if the demands they had laid upon Athens were not satisfied.  Argos‟ 
dealings have been lower than the Boiotian Federation‟s, and yet alliance with them – 
indeed, with both sides – is still a real possibility.  This does not disprove any 
identification between Spartans and Boiotians in this comparison, but it does cast doubt 
on whether Andokides‟ opinions of each party were negative enough to justify reading 
this comparison into it. 
 In that case, we should not assume that the Argives are analogous to „those now 
holding the πόιηο of the Corinthians.‟  This phrase would more appropriately denote the 
democratic faction in Corinth that had successfully carried out the Revolution less than 
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twelve months earlier, and the phrasing „those now holding‟ would serve to differentiate 
this group, not from the Argives nor from the Spartans, but from the oligarchs that had 
held Corinth until so recently.  This would identify the democratic Corinthians and the 
Argives with the same side of the war – the anti-Spartan one – but not with each other as 
homonymous or even intimately associated groups.  And by all of Andokides‟ other 
indications, we must understand that they were decidedly not the same group yet, as 
Argos was attempting to twist Athens‟ arm into providing the assistance necessary to 
gain control of Corinthian territory; political unification feels farther off even than this 
eventuality.  There was no ζπκπνιηηεία, ἰζνπνιηηεία, or even shared land between Argos 
and Corinth at the beginning of 391.
18
 
 
Now we can tackle Xenophon.  As has been frequently noted by previous 
commentators, Xenophon does not cease to refer to Corinth as a place distinct from 
Argos.  Among the examples: 
 
 Hell. IV.v.1: the cattle being kept at Peiraion by those ἐλ ηῇ πόιεη, and the 
following account of Agesilaos‟ assault 
 Hell. IV.v.2: the Isthmian Games, about which more below 
 Hell. IV.v.11, 13: the Amyklaians marching past ηὴλ πόιηλ η῵λ Κνξηλζίωλ 
and being observed by νἱ δ' ἐθ η῵λ Κνξηλζίωλ ἄζηεωο19 
 
All three of these admittedly date before the expulsion of Iphikrates in Xenophon‟s 
narrative, but they are enough to illustrate that Xenophon has not revoked the status of 
                                                          
18
 The Argives are thus a far cry from Griffith 1950‟s representation of them as „that class of opportunist 
which does not even make its own opportunity‟ (255) – or at the very least a far cry from a successful such 
group. 
 
19
 In this instance, I take the use of ἄζηπ to refer specifically to the central locus or the „urban center‟ of 
Corinth, not as a commentary on whether Corinth remained a polis throughout the course of this event. 
 
16 
 
πόιηο from the settlement that had been Corinth before the Revolution.  There is, 
moreover, no shift that we can easily discern, as we might expect to find, in which 
Xenophon ceases to call Corinth Κόξηλζνο.   
What Xenophon does introduce, however, is the mildly periphrastic phrase ἡ 
πόιηο η῵λ Κνξηλζίωλ when the Amyklaians march past.20  By all accounts, „Corinth‟ as 
an entity continued to exist during this period as far as Xenophon was concerned – but 
does he also make a distinction here between Corinth as an abstract identity and the 
Corinthians as a group of people who claim that identity?  Perhaps he does: he certainly 
recognizes both „the Corinthians in the πόιηο‟ and „the Corinthian exiles‟ as two separate 
groups in the context of the Isthmian Games, but neither group seems to be any more or 
less Corinthian than the other.
21
  Assuming that this is a deliberate choice on Xenophon‟s 
part, is it possible that here he presents a conceptual dichotomy between the πόιηο as a 
territorial complex with its own name and abstract identity, and the πόιηο as the territorial 
complex of the people who belong to it? 
Let us look at these three passages in greater detail to see if we can detect this.   
 
The assault on the Peiraion 
The Peiraion and Isthmian Games passages must be considered as a single unit, 
for two reasons.  Both have parallels in Xenophon‟s monograph on Agesilaos, generally 
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thought to predate the Hellenika, and differences between them may be instructive; and at 
any rate, in both sources the discovery of the former leads directly to the controversies of 
the latter.  We have already noted Xenophon‟s characterization of the people 
safeguarding their cattle at Peiraion in the Hellenika, but to expand the quote: 
 
Ἐθ δὲ ηνύηνπ Λαθεδαηκόληνη ἀθνύνληεο η῵λ θεπγόληωλ ὅηη <νἱ> ἐλ ηῇ πόιεη 
πάληα κὲλ ηὰ βνζθήκαηα ἔρνηελ θαὶ ζῴδνηλην ἐλ ηῶ Πεηξαίῳ, πνιινὶ δὲ 
ηξέθνηλην αὐηόζελ, ζηξαηεύνπζη πάιηλ εἰο ηὴλ Κόξηλζνλ, Ἀγεζηιάνπ θαὶ ηόηε 
ἡγνπκέλνπ.22 
 
After this the Lakedaimonians, hearing from the exiles that those in the πόιηο were holding all of 
their cattle and were preserving them in the Peiraion, and that many were being nourished from 
the cattle, they marched against Corinth again, with Agesilaos in command then also. 
 
The dichotomy here is exile v. πόιηο-dwellers, both Corinthians by implication given the 
context of the passage.
23
  But can we read into Xenophon a suggestion that neither party 
is actually „Corinthian,‟ because he does not style either party as such?  Not quite, since 
in his account of the Isthmian Games the exiles are explicitly η῵λ Κνξηλζίωλ again.  
Those ἐλ ηῇ πόιεη are never mentioned again.  In the complementary account in 
Xenophon‟s Agesilaos, the Corinthians in the πόιηο are explicitly labeled νἱ Κνξηλζίνη 
throughout.
24
  Whether this is evidence of the author‟s shorthand, carelessness, or 
different understanding – or presentation – of the relationship between Argos and Corinth 
at the time of the Peiraion incident is ultimately immaterial.  Xenophon understood the 
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πόιηο-dwellers to be Corinthians, though we have yet to decipher what shades of meaning 
this nomenclature may suggest.
25
 
 Did Agesilaos, then, march on Corinth because those ἐλ ηῇ πόιεη were doing well 
for themselves?  Not exclusively.  Between the Revolution-Union narrative and this one, 
Xenophon tells the story of the exiles‟ appeal to Sparta for aid and Agesilaos‟ assault on 
Corinth, which goes poorly for the πόιηο-dwellers.26  „The Corinthians and the Argives‟ 
are presented as the opposing forces who make a truce to bury their dead, which suggests 
that Xenophon means „the exiles‟ when he says „the Corinthians‟ and that the πόιηο-
dwelling Corinthians either no longer exist in numbers enough to settle a truce to bury 
their own dead, or from a different angle that the Argives essentially make up the entire 
population of the πόιηο, whether this is to be taken numerically or in terms of πνιηηεία.  
Then we have Xenophon‟s assertion that „both sides‟ sent garrisons throughout 
the Corinthia and associated territories rather than fight with citizen armies.
27
  „Both 
sides‟ must mean the Spartans plus the Corinthian exiles, and the Argives not necessarily 
plus whatever Corinthians still dwelt in the territory of the πόιηο.  The garrisons are sent 
to Κόξηλζνο (as opposed to ἡ πόιηο η῵λ Κνξηλζίωλ, which still has not appeared yet), 
which indicates that whatever πόιηο-dwellers there were did not have authority enough to 
defend their own territory, be that authority military or political – if military, they simply 
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did not have the manpower; if political, it was not in their hands to provide the defense.  
The Argives provided it, and they did so as a defense against the garrisons of the 
Spartans/exiles according to the limits of Xenophon‟s presentation.  It looks like Corinth 
has become a battleground more than a functioning πόιηο, although this also cannot be 
entirely true if shortly afterwards Xenophon acknowledges the presence of those ἐλ ηῇ 
πόιεη.  But could that mean „the Argive garrison‟?  Could it even mean „the Spartan/exile 
garrison‟?  Probably neither: they would have little involvement with pasturing cattle, 
which some contingent of local civilians would normally have taken care of for the 
garrisons‟ support – another indication of at least some non-military presence operating 
out of the Corinthia and most likely out of Corinth itself. 
 After this first attack by Agesilaos we have Iphikrates‟ activities in Arcadia, the 
Spartans‟ subsequent siege of Corinth based out of Lechaion, and the Athenians‟ 
response of sending a military detachment along with its stonemasons and carpenters to 
rebuild the Long Walls η῵λ Κνξηλζίωλ in short and clean order.28  Then Agesilaos 
marches on Argos for precisely the same reasons for which he will later make his (third) 
assault on Corinth during the Isthmian Games: the Argives are reaping fruits and making 
the most of the war.
 29
  Agesilaos ravages Argos, returns to Corinth for the second time to 
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take out the dockyards, and then returns to Sparta until the Peiraion affair comes up.  So 
says Xenophon. 
 What shall we make of all of this?  A few points are clear.  For Xenophon, 
Corinth so far has meant „the territory within the Long Walls that can be besieged by 
military forces.‟  This definition is not purely territorial, since the continued existence of 
the Walls and the need to send military power there demands that there still be a 
functioning population there in order for this preoccupation with Corinth to make any 
sense.  Argos seems to be treated the same way, and by the point in the narrative that we 
have reached it seems to be so treated for the same reasons: the reaping of fruits and the 
benefiting from the war, both of which require stable populations and at least a minimal 
level of institutional presence, even if those institutions are social rather than political.  
The Long Walls are η῵λ Κνξηλζίωλ, with no mention of the Argives: there is something 
about Corinth as defined by its walls that is still uniquely Corinthian.  Up until the 
Isthmian Games, Corinth apparently retained a measure of territorial integrity, and Argos 
had not yet seen fit to make an attempt at eradicating it.  In fact, Argos has evidently had 
no contact with the Walls at all: Spartans tried to tear them down, and Athenians helped 
to rebuild them.  Sparta, Athens, and Argos alike recognized Corinthian individuality up 
to these limits.   
If the stories of the removal of boundary stones are true, then in this light the 
nature of Argive influence over Corinth by the end of 391 must be considered as only 
extending into the Corinthia and not to Corinth itself.  This level of interaction would 
certainly not suggest ζπκπνιηηεία, since the Argives had not yet territorially reached the 
political center of the Corinthia.  What about ἰζνπνιηηεία? We get the firm impression 
21 
 
that affairs within Corinth are not being decided by the πόιηο-dwellers; but are they being 
decided by the Argives?  Militarily, Sparta and Argos appear to be locked in a struggle 
over Corinth.  Politically, Corinth seems not to be functioning at all.  In fact, the turmoil 
in Corinth and the Corinthia (and even to Sikyon, where the Spartans based at least one 
garrison and whence Athens attempted to repel them) has been entirely too great, and the 
stability of any other πόιηο‟ control there so ephemeral, that Argos has not had the chance 
to assert any kind of hegemony over Corinth, be it social or political. 
 
The Isthmian Games 
Did Argos want to assert hegemony?  Apparently, yes, and the respite of the 
winter of 391/0 may finally have given it the opportunity to do so.  For this issue, let us 
now move on to the Isthmian Games.  Here Xenophon and Plutarch diverge on many 
details, some important, which we will discuss; but they agree that at the beginning of the 
Games, an Argive delegation held the right of leading the sacrifices and chairing the 
Games.
30
  The precise reason for this arrangement, and the shade of meaning attached to 
it, differ slightly in each.  For Xenophon, in line with his account of the exiles‟ return 
experience, the Argives ran the Games ὡο Ἄξγνπο ηῆο Κνξίλζνπ ὄληνο – „on the grounds 
that Corinth was Argos.‟  If Xenophon‟s source for this event was the same as that for the 
Revolution, as seems more than likely given the role the exiles play in each account, we 
should not be surprised to see the same language repeated.  Plutarch‟s explanation, and 
by extension his view of the Union at this time, is less absolute.  For him, the Argives 
chaired the Games Ἀξγείωλ δὲ ηὴλ Κόξηλζνλ ἐρόληωλ ηόηε – „because the Argives held 
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Corinth then.‟  Argos and Corinth need not be the same πόιηο or maintain any agreements 
about πνιηηεία for this formulation to hold good; Argos need only have military 
dominance over Corinth, which seems to be all that Plutarch is implying. 
Neither source – nor any one ancient source explicitly, and none of the modern 
scholarship on the Union – invokes the rocky and openly „nationalistic‟ history of 
Corinth‟s and Argos‟ dealings with each other in the sphere of athletics.  All of them 
ought to: the past informs the present in particularly important and suggestive ways.  
Corinth was the third πόιηο to institute a pan-Hellenic contest, after Olympia and Delphi 
(and only 6 years after the first Pythian Games); the first stephanitic games at Isthmia 
occurred in 580, controlled by Corinth and not to be relinquished until the Roman 
destruction in 146 B.C.
31
  The Nemean Games were first held soon afterwards, in 573.
32
  
The competitive impetus behind the formation of these three new contests within a 14-
year period is obvious; but Isthmia and Nemea enjoyed a unique rivalry.  For in its 
earliest days, the Nemean Games were controlled by Kleonai, whose proximity to both 
Argos and Corinth has already been noticed and which at the time was much more 
closely tied to Argos than to Corinth.  In fact, it appears that the Nemean agonothetai and 
hellanodikai were chosen from neither the Nemeans nor the Kleonaians, but from the 
administrative machinery of Argos.
33
  The Nemea, though clearly an attempt to break 
into the odd-year hiatuses between the other three games, was also evidently a ploy by 
Argos to assert its equality in pan-Hellenic influence against its closest large neighbor. 
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It is hard to imagine Argos‟ initiative in 573 as a way to bait Corinth into any kind 
of action; when Corinth involved itself in the Nemean Games a century later, it 
apparently did so from its own set of motives.  Corinth‟s expansion in the decades 
following the Persian Wars evidently included a successful assault on Kleonai shortly 
after Kleonai and Argos had joined forces to attack Mykenai in 465/4.  Corinth was able 
to time its capture of Kleonai just when Argos had suddenly become embroiled in a pair 
of political revolutions and was unable to provide full support to their neighbor to the 
northwest.  A scholiast on Pindar mentions that, for a brief time, Corinth controlled the 
Nemean Games rather than Kleonai; that datum fits nowhere else but here.
34
  There is no 
direct evidence of this usurpation being directed intentionally against Argos, as either 
part of a systematic attack plan or an uncoordinated power grab, but no great hypothetical 
leap is required to draw that connection.
35
  Whatever its motivations, Corinth had 
acquired unprecedented control of two of the four pan-Hellenic games.   
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, Corinthian control of the Nemean Games did not last 
long, though we do not know under what circumstances Corinth relinquished control of 
Kleonai.  Argos cannot be credited with a victory against Corinth in this period, nor is 
there evidence of an outcry over Corinth‟s dual presidency from any of the other Greek 
πόιεηο (though the idea that no such opposition existed is unimaginable: Elis in particular 
must have shouted with the loudest of them).  Corinth‟s retreat may have been motivated 
simply by overextension, either in military or in administrative terms: could one πόιηο 
reasonably preside over two sets of pan-Hellenic games?  If any πόιηο could have done in 
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the 460‟s, it would have been Corinth.  The sources simply are not there to tell us, but we 
may suspect a pan-Hellenic backlash behind Corinth‟s withdrawal.  At any rate, control 
of the Nemean Games was returned to Kleonai and, by extension, to Argos. 
By the time of the Union, the athletic landscape had changed again.  After the 
peace of Nikias, Elis and Argos both entered into the alliance against Sparta.
36
  Within 
five years, the temple at Nemea was destroyed by Spartan forces, and the Games were 
moved into Argive territory until 335.
37
  The evidence for this transfer is purely 
archaeological, and there is no way of knowing whether the Kleonaians were still 
presiding over the games under Argive auspices; but our best guess is negative.  When 
Argos moved the Games from Nemean territory into its own, they claimed full control 
over the event; Kleonai must have already drifted under Corinthian influence by then.  
When the revolution in Corinth occurred, therefore, the status of Corinth and Argos as 
rival overseers of pan-Hellenic festivals was at its starkest.  Memories in Argos of the 
Corinthian aggression 75 years earlier may also have been strong, and further rekindled 
by the Corinthian democrats‟ invitation of Argive assistance to solidify their new regime, 
which Corinth had certainly not extended to Argos in their own time of need.  Some in 
Argos must have seen this turn of events as an entitlement for Argos to assume control of 
the Isthmian Games – and some in Argos, who probably overlapped with the group 
already mentioned, would have seen this assumption of control as balancing the ledger 
against Corinth‟s previous usurpation.  In that mindset, the precise nature of Argos‟ 
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presence in Corinth (much like the precise nature of Corinth‟s presence in Kleonai) had 
no direct bearing on its decision to assume control of the Games.
38
 
The difference between the forms of Argive presence in Xenophon‟s and 
Plutarch‟s accounts – probably drawn by the source materials rather than the interpreters, 
given the tone of each narrative – is consistent with and informs each author‟s account of 
Agesilaos‟ arrival.  According to Xenophon, when the Argives saw Agesilaos and his 
army approaching Isthmia, they „left behind both the sacrificial animals and the ritual 
meal, and in great fear they returned to the city by way of the road passing Kenchreai.‟39  
Which city is meant is unclear in the Greek (εἰο ηὸ ἄζηπ).  Given Kenchreai‟s location – 
almost due east of Corinth and due south of Isthmia – a straight-line path would suggest 
that the Argives were fleeing back home to Argos; but if Kenchreai were a natural stop 
on the road back to Argos, why would Xenophon feel the need to mention it?  The detail 
makes more sense if the Argives took a roundabout route back to Corinth, presumably in 
order to avoid any of Agesilaos‟ men who might be following farther behind him.  That 
the Argives would return to Corinth should in fact be the expected solution if, as 
Xenophon claims, the two πόιεηο were one by now; why would they travel farther, 
especially if they thought they had a right to chair the Games that had only just begun? 
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Plutarch‟s Agesilaos, on the other hand, „drove away those who had just 
performed the sacrifice to the god, and they left behind all of their prepared materials.‟40  
This, too, is consistent with his characterization of the Union, and contrasts appropriately 
with Xenophon‟s impression of voluntary flight on the part of the Argives.  If Argos held 
Corinth by military force at the time of the Games rather than by political incorporation, 
Plutarch‟s Argives are perhaps supposed to look like they have claimed the chairmanship 
of the Games by that same force.  Military force would be required to shake Argos‟ hold, 
like for like. 
The same distinction explains the Corinthians‟ (those ἐλ ηῇ πόιεη, a phrase 
Plutarch does not use) response to Agesilaos‟ arrival.  Plutarch‟s Corinthians „implored 
him to chair the Games,‟ and watch the exiles take over following the Spartan‟s refusal.41  
This befits victims of another πόιηο‟ domination, as opposed to willing collaborators in a 
Union.  Plutarch‟s Corinthians ἐλ ηῇ πόιεη either are not in a position to take over the 
presidency of the Games themselves, or (more likely) do not think they are.  They are 
willing to allow Agesilaos to chair the Games because he drove away the Argives who 
had claimed the position improperly, and this was their show of gratitude.  Agesilaos‟ 
refusal becomes a decorous decline of a gift, and the exiles‟ performance of the sacrifices 
and chairmanship (under Spartan security forces, apparently to keep the Argives out) as 
the rightful restoration of a group of unfairly banished πνιίηηθνη (many of them 
aristocrats and perhaps the natural performers of these rites before the Revolution) to 
their religious duties. 
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Xenophon‟s Agesilaos, on the other hand, „pitched his camp in the sacred plot, he 
himself sacrificed to the god, and remained until the Corinthian exiles had performed the 
sacrifices to Poseidon and the games.‟42  This is the action of a general who cares not a 
whit for the opinions or preferences of anyone who was at Isthmia before he arrives.  He 
is not offered the chairmanship, and he does not refuse it; rather, he treats the entire field 
of the Games as a garrison site for his soldiers and makes the first completed sacrifice of 
the event (for himself and his own men, no doubt – not for the Corinthians).  The exiles 
are not granted the chairmanship, nor do they treat it as if there were any doubt about 
their prerogative to preside – they simply perform the sacrifices and carry on, under 
Agesilaos‟ watchful eye (which now seems to be directed more at the Corinthians ἐλ ηῇ 
πόιεη rather than an external Argive threat).  And the Corinthians ἐλ ηῇ πόιεη have no say 
in the matter at all, or rather Agesilaos and the exiles give them no say and simply take 
matters into their own hands. 
Agesilaos, therefore, assumed the direction of the Isthmian Games.  By what right 
did he do this?  We have seen usurpations of athletic contests from the previous century; 
is this what Agesilaos was up to?  Hardly: his concrete motivation, at least on the face of 
it, was to restore the right of presidency over the Isthmian Games to the Corinthians.  
Evidently he still considered the Corinthian exiles to be Corinthians, and thus qualified 
for the job.  Humiliation of Argos was undoubtedly another impetus for Agesilaos‟ 
banishment of the Argives from the field, and this message was conveyed to all present 
no less strongly than the inability of the Corinthians ἐλ ηῇ πόιεη to handle the Games 
themselves. 
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In what capacities, then, did Agesilaos and the Corinthian exiles serve in these 
games?  The exiles took over the posts of hellanodikai from the Argives, this much is 
clear.
43
  If we can extrapolate from the conduct of the Olympian Games, the hellanodikai 
ought to have been chosen by lot by the governing council of the controlling πόιηο – the 
Elean Council in Olympia, and thus presumably the Corinthian βνπιή at Isthmia.  For the 
pre-Agesilean selection, based on our reconstruction of the Union, the Corinthians ἐλ ηῇ 
πόιεη ceded their right to preside to the Argives (without undue coercion on Argos‟ part, 
by our guess).  There is no indication of how Agesilaos and the exiles determined which 
of them would sit as hellanodikai; we may as well assume that they used a lot system 
among themselves, over which Agesilaos presided but de facto had no power to sway the 
results.  In such a situation, the Corinthians ἐλ ηῇ πόιεη neither gained nor lost influence 
over the conduct of the games when Agesilaos took control.  Their participation remained 
spectatory. 
And what sort of control did Agesilaos take?  The most obvious role to 
accommodate him is that of agonothetes, the financial organizer of and, by some 
definitions, president over the games.  There is nothing to confirm this suspicion, largely 
because our evidence on the role of the agonothetes before Roman times is nearly non-
existent, and evidence from the Roman period is limited to attestations of names and a 
pervasive whiff of the financial about his involvement.  He had no role in selecting 
                                                          
43
 It is hard to know how many hellanodikai there were for the Isthmian Games at this time.  The Eleans 
apparently based their tally on the number of tribes that had been absorbed into the Elean union, which in 
the 390‟s stood at nine and would be cemented at ten in the 340s (Crowther 2003, 65).  By Roman times, 
the Isthmian Games also used ten hellanodikai; this clearly was an import from the conduct of the 
Olympian Games.  Whether this importation had become standard in the fourth century BC is unknowable; 
either it had, and there were thus nine hellanodikai at the Isthmian Games of 390, or the Corinthians 
adopted a similar process of deciding the number by tribes (traditionally established by Aletes in the fifth 
generation after Herakles; Salmon 1984, 38 and 413), which would have made for eight hellanodikai. 
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hellanodikai, nor in selecting the athletes – the hellanodikai handled all screening and 
testing on that count.  Even for the Olympian Games, we have no testimony of how and 
by whom the opening sacrifices were performed; but neither can we point to another 
stage of the festival when the agonothetes would publicly acknowledge his responsibility 
for the games.  At least one of the opening sacrifices must have been performed by him, 
or on his behalf or under his supervision, simply because of the nature of his office.  
Agesilaos performed the opening sacrifice, and then stood back and allowed the exiles to 
conduct the games – in other words, he fulfilled the maximum range of duties that we can 
plausibly assign to the agonothetes.  As for his fitness for the position: we have less 
information about how agonothetai were selected than we do for hellanodikai, but given 
the financial importance of the officer, he was almost certainly appointed or volunteered 
rather than chosen by lot; nor, given his distance from the conduct of the games 
themselves, did he need to be a member of the controlling community.
44
  Hence, an 
Argive initially held the office without any ado worthy of mention; likewise Agesilaos.  
His office was ceremonial; the games belonged to the Corinthian exiles. 
The two reports about the Isthmian incident illustrate two different traditions 
about the relationship between the Corinthian exiles, the Corinthian πόιηο-dwellers, and 
the Argives.  For Xenophon (or more precisely, for his sources), the Union had reached a 
stage that Argos could consider complete (whatever that should be taken to mean – see 
below), giving them the right to chair the Games, but not so secure a stage that the 
Argives were willing to stake their lives on it.  The Union was full, but not settled, and 
the Argives were willing to take a small hit now in order to protect their ability to 
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 He certainly did not need to be in the Roman period: see Meritt 1931, 14-18. 
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establish it further afterwards.  For Plutarch, the Union was one-sided and far from 
pleasing to the πόιηο-dwellers, being rather the product of Argive aggression than mutual 
negotiation.  The Argives were not willing to hand over a right they had earned by 
muscle, and Agesilaos had to respond in kind to expel them from the sacred plot.  
Xenophon‟s account makes out the Argives and the Corinthians ἐλ ηῇ πόιεη to be willing 
but weak; Plutarch‟s makes them militarily mismatched enemies.  Xenophon‟s smells of 
both anti-Argive and anti- πόιηο-Corinthian sentiment; Plutarch‟s is simply pro-
Agesilaos. 
Then we have the very brief account by Diodoros:   
εὐζὺ δὲ η῵λ Ἰζζκίωλ ἐπειζόληωλ δηεθέξνλην πεξὶ ηῆο ζέζεωο ηνῦ ἀγ῵λνο· θαὶ 
πνιιὰ θηινλεηθεζάληωλ ἐθξάηεζαλ νἱ Λαθεδαηκόληνη θαὶ ηνὺο θπγάδαο ἐπνίεζαλ 
ζεῖλαη ηὸλ ἀγ῵λα. 
 
Since the Isthmian Games were coming up just then, [the Lakedaimonians and the Boiotians-
Athenians-Argives-Corinthians] quarreled over the chairmanship of the games; and after much 
contention the Lakedaimonians gained the upper hand and they made it so that the exiles chaired 
the games.
45
 
 
The two sides δηεθέξνλην, with the Lakedaimonians θηινλεηθεζάληωλ.  This looks more 
like Plutarch‟s account than Xenophon‟s, although „driving out‟ the Argives (ἐμήιαζελ) 
and „quarreling‟ with them have substantially different implications – there could 
theoretically be no military activity here at all (though this is highly improbable, merely 
conceivable).  This suggests a tradition about the Union in which nothing was settled at 
all at the time of the Isthmian Games, and in which both the exiles (with Spartan brawn) 
and Argos had some claim to their presidency that needed to be resolved through some 
kind of protracted „quarrel.‟46  Diodoros also omits the fact, which both Xenophon and 
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 Diodoros, Bibliotheke 14.86.5. 
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 We have already seen that Diodoros places the event of Argos‟ forced takeover of Corinth after 
Iphikrates‟ assault on the Spartans (aided by „some of the allied forces in Corinth‟, 14.91.2), and thus later 
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Plutarch record consistently with each other, that the Argives returned after the Spartans 
and the exiles departed and re-enacted the Games entirely.
47
  This obstacle was not about 
to deter Argos from achieving the sublimation of Corinth, whatever form they intended it 
to take. 
 There is one somber footnote to the account of the Isthmia, preserved in 
Xenophon:  a few days after the games had ended, the temple of Poseidon was seen to be 
on fire.  The culprit was then and remains unknown.
48
  All we have to go on is an account 
by Pausanias about a conflict at Olympia in 399/398, in which Sparta attacked the Eleans 
in continued retribution for the alliance of 420 and ruined the temple of Hera.
49
  
Agesilaos is not attested to have been the Spartan commander at this event; nevertheless, 
the blame probably does not lie with the Argives. 
 
The Peace of Antalkidas 
 After this event, our sources go silent until the Peace of Antalkidas in 386 and its 
requirement that ηὰο δὲ ἄιιαο Ἑιιελίδαο πόιεηο θαὶ κηθξὰο θαὶ κεγάιαο αὐηνλόκνπο 
ἀθεῖλαη („all the other Hellenic πόιεηο, both small and large, be returned αὐηνλνκία‟)50.  
The matter of Iphikrates‟ activity around Corinth and Argos is, in fact, largely a non-issue 
                                                                                                                                                                             
than the Isthmian Games.  Therefore, the Corinthian exiles and their Spartan backup had to „quarrel‟ with 
the entire anti-Spartan alliance to get their way.  We have, once again, a self-consistent account, and a 
thoroughly different one from the other two. 
 
47
 Hellenika loc. cit.; Plut. Agesilaos 21.5-6.  For Xenophon, the Argives are reclaiming what is theirs by 
established political arrangement; for Plutarch, they are reclaiming what is theirs by overpowering military 
force.  Either way, neither‟s account is compromised by retaining this fact. 
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 Ibid. 4.5.4. 
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 Pausanias 5.20.4-5 (as in Miller 2004b, 187-188). 
 
50
 Hellenika 5.1.31.   
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in our formulation of the Union.
51
  If there remained a separate community of Corinthians 
throughout that was not under any obligation to call themselves Argives, and direct 
Argive involvement in the affairs of the Corinthian πόιηο was as minimal as we have 
argued, then the way Iphikrates interacts with them no longer presents any special 
challenge to our theory.  Nor is there any special reason to believe that further steps were 
taken by Argos after the Iphikrates affair to consolidate authority in the Corinthian πόιηο, 
nor has there ever been reason to believe so; arguments from silence go both ways, and 
both ways are equally counterproductive.  We see no evidence that the relationship 
between Argos and Corinth was changed by or after Iphikrates‟ appearance on the scene, 
and thus no evidence for any progression in the Union beyond what was already 
occurring at the same pace as before Iphikrates arrived. 
 The Sardis conference can be similarly disposed of in a few lines.
52
  It is in fact 
not greatly different from the situation encountered after the Peace of Antalkidas, as we 
shall see:  Argos does not want to return αὐηνλνκία to Corinth, its rationale being that it 
would lose its hold on Corinth and all the work it had done would be brought to naught.  
Again, though this could refer to a political stranglehold as well as a territorial one, it 
need not.  Whether the conference took place before or after the Isthmian Games (we 
cannot say for sure, since Xenophon places it in his separate narrative of the naval war), 
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 See, in contrast, Griffith 1950, who made his movements the foundation for his two-stage theory (246-
247).  Tuplin 1982, in his usual way, complicates the question by introducing grammatical quibbles (78), a 
tactic for which Whitby 1984 rightly upbraids and corrects him (300) – though without substantially 
altering the effect of the passage as a whole, which we argue (as do both Tuplin and Whitby) serves merely 
to confirm the narrative we have already pieced together. 
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 A piece of the puzzle treated in earnest for the first time by Tuplin 1982 (77), coming to the same 
conclusion for the purposes of his own argument (one-stage unification), namely, that the text does not 
exhibit any real change in the nature of the Union.  Whitby 1984‟s rejoinder (299) adds nothing special; 
again, the passage is merely fuel on whatever fire each commentator has kindled. 
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the time lapse between the two events cannot have been great.  If the conference came 
first, we can deduce from the state of affairs at the games that there was no real change in 
the Union; if the conference came second, it is unlikely that the Union had recovered or 
progressed very far in the interim following Agesilaos‟ considerable interference at the 
games.  In short, the Union as presented by Xenophon underwent no notable 
development throughout the second half of the Corinthian War, and searches for evidence 
in these two incidents turn out ultimately to be based on overly broad concepts of 
„imperialism‟ and „αὐηνλνκία.‟ 
Xenophon, the only one of our sources to consider how the clause given above 
from the Peace applied to Argos and Corinth, represents νἱ Κνξίλζηνη as in violation of 
this clause in that they did not send away the Argive garrison (νὐθ ἐμέπεκπνλ ηὴλ η῵λ 
Ἀξγείωλ θξνπξάλ).53  For Xenophon, the presence of Argive military forces in the 
Corinthia (indeed, at Corinth itself – εἰ κὴ ἀπίνηελ ἐθ ηῆο Κνξίλζνπ) indicated a loss of 
αὐηνλνκία on the part of the Corinthians.  Agesilaos apparently agreed, threatening 
military action against both sides if the garrison did not leave Corinth.  Both sides 
acquiesced, though grudgingly, and αὐηὴ ἐθ' αὑηῆο ἡ η῵λ Κνξηλζίωλ πόιηο ἐγέλεην – „the 
πόιηο of the Corinthians itself became in charge of itself [again].‟54 
 What does this passage not say about the relationship between Argos and 
Corinth?  Most obviously, it does not say that Argos was maintaining any kind of 
political presence in Corinth at the time: there were no magistrates to be dismissed, no 
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 See Tuplin 1982, 78, who again comes to the same conclusions as befits his argument and helpfully 
reminds the reader that „Xenophon depends on his reader‟s recollection of [previous passages in the 
Hellenika about the Union] to enable him to understand what he is talking about‟ – i.e., that Xenophon‟s 
narrative (however we interpret it) is all of the same cloth, and that the reader necessarily encounters it only 
piece by piece does not cast aspersion on Xenophon‟s ability to coordinate a narrative. 
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new laws to be overturned, and no institutions to be dissolved or reinstated, at least as far 
as Xenophon knew – or cared.  The Argive presence in the Corinthia appears still to have 
been military only, since only a garrison – and only one garrison at that – comes into 
question here.  So unless the garrison was exceptionally large or well-placed at Corinth, 
the actual Argive presence, in terms of numbers, was minimal. 
 And not unwelcome.  Both the Corinthians ἐλ ηῇ πόιεη and the Argives had to be 
threatened before the garrison was dismissed.
55
  Their motivations for resisting the 
dismissal are obscure, but we can imagine the mental discontinuities that the Corinthians 
ἐλ ηῇ πόιεη in particular must have experienced when the Spartans, against whose 
aggression they had so happily received the Argive garrison for defense, suddenly 
threatened a war against them if they kept the garrison!  A major element of the 
Corinthians‟ hesitation to dismiss the Argives must have been a deep-seated distrust of 
Sparta, to the point that they doubted the likelihood of Sparta‟s abiding by the treaty‟s 
αὐηνλνκία clause for very long. This would have been mixed with the sobering 
recognition that Corinth probably could not have fielded a military defense force of its 
own, should subsequent events have called for one, after so many years of semi-existence 
as an independent actor.   The Argives seem not to have had any greater trust in the 
acceptance and enforcement of the Peace.  We cannot say what might have happened if 
the Corinthians had agreed to dismiss the garrison but the Argives had refused, or vice 
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 This is clearly a different situation from that in Boiotia, where the Thebans attempted to speak on behalf 
of the entire region of Boiotia, and Agesilaos had already begun a muster of allied and perioikic troops 
before the Thebans agreed to grant αὐηνλνκία to the Boiotian πόιεηο (Hellenika 5.1.32-33).  Since this 
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(Hellenika Oxyrhynchia XVI.3).  Garrisons did not figure prominently in the Federation‟s methods of self-
control. 
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versa.  But any extrapolation based on Xenophon‟s treatment so far of the relationship 
between the Corinthians ἐλ ηῇ πόιεη and the Argives would point to their support for the 
garrison remaining mutual. 
  
Which account do we prefer? 
We have, then, four different interpretations of the Union of Corinth and Argos 
from four different sources, only one of which tells anything like a complete story and all 
four of which have strong and inherent prejudices that come into play in their 
representations.  Andokides favored oligarchic „governments‟ and was attempting to 
subvert the Athenian and allied desire to continue the war by emphasizing the risks that 
Athens would be compelled to take on if it persisted.  Xenophon also sympathized with 
aristocratic forms of „government,‟ but he was writing from hindsight and a perspective 
that could interpret the process in light of the resolution.  Diodoros wrote almost 350 
years after the Union affair occurred, and probably did not appreciate the complexities 
and false starts of the unification process.
56
  Plutarch wrote still 150 years later, at a time 
when Greek αὐηνλνκία was essentially meaningless, and he used individuals and events 
of the past more for moral illumination than for historical instruction. 
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 Diodoros‟ account of the Argive invasion of Corinth in 390 must be either misinterpreted or misplaced.  
Even if we admit that Xenophon was not above distorting or even concealing events that undermined the 
narrative he wished to present, we can hardly believe that he would have ignored an outright Argive 
military assault on Corinth culminating in the capture of its acropolis as being unhelpful to his already anti-
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destruction of the temple of Poseidon, which we find the more likely solution. 
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It is Xenophon‟s account that we ought to accept.  Andokides‟ formulation is not 
incompatible with it, especially given the very early stage of the Union that his speech 
represents: the Union took another year and a half to consolidate itself to a stage where 
the Argives could claim the right to perform religious duties, and that only when no 
external threat was near, so unification as a thing only hoped for in the winter of 391 does 
not feel at all out of place.  Not only is Plutarch‟s account designed to serve Agesilaos as 
opposed to Argos or Corinth, but its author also had no intention of presenting the history 
of the Union, and we would not be surprised if his account were based at least partially 
on that of Diodoros, whose command of the nuances and the timeline of the Union raise 
more questions than it answers.  Xenophon‟s own account, when interpreted 
conservatively and without interpolations from other (later) sources, is internally self-
consistent throughout his narrative and does not claim any more aggressiveness on 
Argos‟ part or passivity on the πόιηο-dwelling Corinthians‟ part than would be reasonable 
in the climate of war and the shadow of Sparta.  This last point, noticing as it does the 
hints of Argive and πόιηο-Corinthian rationality that appear in Xenophon‟s narrative, just 
may give us the license to look at this author‟s account of the Union as more sympathetic 
to Argos and Corinth than we would expect it to be – perhaps the most persuasive reason 
to take him at his word. 
 With all of this established, specific reference to those accusations levied by the 
returning exiles concerning the forced sharing in Argive πνιηηεία or their comparative 
influence with metics hardly seems necessary.  To draw the argument together 
concretely: we cannot deny that, in regard to the πνιηηεία issue, Xenophon seems to 
contradict himself by consistently referring to the residents of the Corinthian πόιηο 
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instead of to Corinthians.  These just may be called Argives in a narrowly technical 
sense, but they do not personally identify with that label, Xenophon does not identify 
them by that label, and – most importantly – the Argives appear to be in no mood to force 
them into accepting that label.  As far as the metic issue is concerned, the Corinthians ἐλ 
ηῇ πόιεη are no more or less likely in our model to be treated like resident aliens by the 
Argives as they are still to be regarded as Corinthians, since the Argives have not been 
particularly forceful with their imposition of political uniformity. 
 The explanation in Xenophon‟s defense, in fact, is obvious: the charges levied by 
the returning exiles applied only to themselves.
57
  They were shunned by their former 
neighbors, and they parlayed their resentment at the societal changes in Corinth into these 
charges.  Invited back by families and friends though they were, the returnees would 
nonetheless have been viewed by the supporters of the new democratic regime as traitors 
to their πόιηο, and not entitled to be called Corinthians under the new government.  To 
that end, the exiles felt about as welcome in Corinthian affairs as a metic would have 
done – that is, not welcome at all.58   
The matter of the Argive πνιηηεία feels like a slight exaggeration on the exiles‟ 
part, but it comes in the same vein as the metic complaint.  One can imagine catcalls from 
disapproving Corinthian democrats encouraging the exiles to go join the Spartans; at least 
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 A suggestion that Tuplin 1982 raises (76), but does not pursue quite as far as we do.  He also suggests 
that the „metics‟ might in fact be a term for those Corinthians who consider themselves „Argives‟ now 
(following Griffith 1950), but only as a formality – and at any rate, the logic behind this suggestion makes 
little sense, and assumes an amount of rancor on the exiles‟ part against their democratic compatriots that 
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 Griffith 1950 interpreted this comment as „effective merely as a piece of rhetoric‟ because of the decline 
in aristocratic status that the exiles suffered upon their return, or else a commentary on the unification of 
Corinthian and Argive citizenships (248).  For our purposes, social status has much less to do with this 
complaint (though not nothing to do with it; the social fall surely added to their sense of belittlement and 
their neighbors‟ jeering, but the tensions ran deeper even than that. 
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they would have shared some ideas about good government.  Heckling about Argive 
πνιηηεία, on the other hand, would have come off as a non sequitur.  Perhaps we ought to 
think of this matter as a sense, felt strongly by the exiles, that that they were no longer 
welcome as Corinthians and that, since Argos was the only other strong presence in 
Corinthian affairs at the time, they would be forced to apply for Argive πνιηηεία in order 
to stay in their ancestral land.  This they were wholly unwilling to do, and when they 
decided to stage a counter-revolution, it was based on a feeling that their own people had 
rejected them and they had nowhere else to turn – except to Argos, in mental surrender. 
Now we can move on to the important questions: What sort of Union was it?  And 
how does it fit into the CPC‟s model of the πόιηο – if at all? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE UNION AND THE NATURE OF THE πόλις 
Let us begin with Bearzot‟s comment on Xenophon, which we alluded to above: 
 
It is interesting how Xenophon reflects here an absolute incompatibility between the πνιηηεία of a 
city and alternative πνιηηεῖαη (whether talking about ἰζνπνιηηεία or federal ζπκπνιηηεία) and a 
total lack of comprehension between the supporters of the new “Polis-übergreifende 
Herrschaftorganisationen,” … and the exponents of the traditional view of the πόιηο: to transform 
the πνιηηεία of a city into an ἰζνπνιηηεία is equivalent in fact to ἀθαλίδεζζαη, and thus to become 
involved in the development of a ζπκπνιηηεία involves the serious risk of „disappearing‟, in 
primarily a conceptual rather than a physical sense, as an autonomous city.
59
 
 
This passage refers to the complaints of the Corinthian exiles upon returning to Corinth in 
392.  What we have seen, however, is an attempt at unification that apparently never 
achieved the formulation of any new πνιηηεία arrangements, unless it did so between the 
Isthmian Games and the Peace of Antalkidas – and in that case, we must assume that 
Xenophon either had no information on how (or how easily) they were reversed or did 
not consider it noteworthy.  If any aspect of the Union has met with universal agreement 
among modern commentators, it has been the sheer uniqueness of the event, and those 
who have argued for ἰζνπνιηηεία or ζπκπνιηηεία have stressed that no other arrangements 
of its kind are known until the Hellenistic period, and even then the circumstances and 
policies are quite different. 
 Let us limit ourselves, therefore, to the Union that Xenophon does inform us 
about (based on sources for which we can less readily find reasons for doubt): the Union 
that sought and achieved a firmly planted military presence in the political center of the 
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Corinthia, but that does not appear to have made any further progress towards unification 
in πνιηηεία.  How can this situation fit in the πόιηο model established by the CPC? 
 
 The πόιηο, in the findings of the CPC, could refer both to the location of physical 
settlement of a group of people and to the community of settlers itself – the city and the 
state.  In its fullest form, πόιηο referred to the existence of both senses as a single unit.  
The territory of the settlement was considered an integral part of the community, and the 
πόιηο in its „canonical‟ sense referred to the community of residents involved in 
institutionalized political systems exercising itself upon the territory claimed by the 
community (whether in its settlement pattern or through later acquisitions).  Thus, the 
πόιηο-city was only a πόιηο if it was the political focal point of its state, and the πόιηο-
state was only a πόιηο if it had a city as a political focal point.  By the Classical period, 
the πόιηο had achieved the definition of „city-state.‟  Of course, to be properly called a 
πόιηο the settlement/community needed to be of a certain size: larger than a θώκε village, 
large enough to assert itself over the territory it claimed as its purview. 
 Hansen was quick to recognize and methodical to illustrate everything that his 
definition does not entail.  He does not suggest that the „city-state‟ of the πόιηο possessed 
the amount or types of bureaucratic institutions that characterize later city-state 
civilizations, nor was it expected to.
60
    Hansen also wanted to erase from scholarly 
thought the belief that the institutional integrity and freedom of action of the πόιηο 
required αὐηνλνκία.  The CPC found that no such necessity existed: a substantial number 
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of πόιεηο existed as dependents of another πόιηο, whether by traditional relationship or 
through political or military arrangements.  Hansen‟s itemized Typology of Dependent 
Poleis re-introduced the concept that a πόιηο could exist in subjection or subservience to 
another without losing its particular identity as a πόιηο.  It also sought to revise scholarly 
understanding of such events as the Peace of Antalkidas that ended the Corinthian War, 
which demanded that αὐηνλνκία be returned to all πόιεηο that possessed it when the war 
began.  These non-autonomous πόιεηο had not ceased to be πόιεηο, as we might have 
thought before: they had simply lost their full independence of action, and they retained 
all of the essential settlement and community features that constituted the πόιηο. 
 We shall start small, as it were, with this schematic of fourteen different types of 
dependent πόιεηο, to see in which category Corinth fits best – after all, we cannot deny 
that Corinth had become a dependent πόιηο to Argos certainly by the time of the Isthmian 
Games – and what the implications might be for its broader application in Hansen‟s 
model.
61
  Three of these categories seem possible candidates: 
 
 „a πόιηο situated inside the territory of a larger πόιηο‟ (1) 
 „a πόιηο which persists as a πόιηο after a ζπκπνιηηεία with another πόιηο‟ (9) 
 „a πόιηο which is at the same time a civic subdivision of another πόιηο‟ (14) 
 
Hansen admits the occurrence of overlap between categories; so shall we.   
(1) at first sight seems almost inarguable: we have seen that Xenophon never 
ceased to call Corinth a πόιηο, and that Argos had managed to achieve territorial mastery 
in the Corinthia without any sign of drastically affecting the working of the local 
administration.  But in Hansen‟s formulation, this type of dependency does not preclude 
the dependent πόιηο‟ possession of territory that can still be called its own.  For his 
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example he chooses Mykalessos, a dependency of Tanagra that nevertheless sat on an 
expanse of land that shared its name.
62
  That land remained distinctly Mykalessian, 
despite – or in tandem with – the larger Tanagran supremacy.  In that case, we should 
assume that the local authorities at Mykalessos πόιηο exercised the kind of control over 
Mykalessos ρώξα that any πόιηο would exercise over its ρώξα, namely the primary 
association of all residents of the ρώξα with the administrative body of the πόιηο, and the 
πόιηο as the default location for adjudication and deliberation for those residents – with 
the exception that the authorities at Tanagra πόιηο could probably overrule the 
administrative body of Mykalessos πόιηο if its governance over Mykalessos ρώξα was 
unsatisfactory, or if the issue at hand affected Tanagra πόιηο or ρώξα more, or at least no 
less, than it did Mykalessos πόιηο or ρώξα.  In other words, the political hierarchy would 
be absolute, with Tanagra at the top. 
Did Corinth govern its own ρώξα while under Argive control?  We cannot say, 
but signs point to „no‟.  We have already seen the weakness of Corinthian institutions 
after the Revolution, the Argive occupation, and the Spartan onslaughts of the next two 
years.  The garrison remained the unifying force between Argos and Corinth, and 
Xenophon‟s use of the phrase ἡ πόιηο η῵λ Κνξηλζίωλ strongly suggests that some 
essential role of the πόιηο that had previously made it worthy of being called „Corinth‟ 
had been lost.  The Corinthians were still Corinthians, but Corinth was not still Corinth.  
Now in Hansen‟s formulation, the single most essential feature of the πόιηο is its 
relationship to its „hinterland‟ (ρώξα), and that every πόιηο has a ρώξα „inextricably 
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linked‟ to it.63  This would seem to imply that the πόιηο-city exercises governance over its 
ρώξα in some form; and Corinth seems not to have done.   
We should probably rule out, then, Corinth as a πόιηο functioning in the „usual‟ 
manner, exercising authority over its ρώξα and thus retaining one of the essential features 
of a πόιηο as state; we also find compelling grounds for not including it under 
dependency type (1).  And yet, the administration of ἡ πόιηο η῵λ Κνξηλζίωλ, in what little 
capacity remained to it, still rested with the Corinthians ἐλ ηῇ πόιεη.  In that respect, the 
relationship between Argos and Corinth would match the parameters of (1).  But the 
ρώξα issue indicates that the Union must have been of a type with less detachment 
between the two parties than (1) can allow. 
(9) would perhaps be the preferred option for those who argue that a ζπκπνιηηεία 
occurred between Argos and Corinth.  This option would allow Corinth to retain its 
πνιηηεία without sacrificing its authority over its own ρώξα, and would also justify 
Argos‟ presence in Corinth and indicate shared authority over the entire ρώξα.  Can we 
conceive of the Corinthian ρώξα as shared property?  By our reading of Xenophon, such 
an arrangement is not impossible; but the evidence is lacking, and what signs we have 
seen of Argive creep into Corinthian ρώξα, especially taking into account its military 
nature, suggests otherwise.  Would the final achievement of ζπκπνιηηεία, if that was what 
Argos desired, have restored control of the Corinthian ρώξα to the Corinthians ἐλ ηῇ 
πόιεη?  Again, conceivable, but a counter-factual scenario that cannot be relied on for this 
argument.  
Furthermore, Hansen‟s chosen example is that of Mantinea and Helisson, dating 
from about the same time as the Union.  The ζπκπνιηηεία makes an exchange of 
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magistrates one of its fundamental elements; the political machinery of each πόιηο feeds 
off of the other, and the two become governmentally symbiotic.  We do not find any 
support for this kind of system between our two πόιεηο.  In fact, the relationship is 
demonstrably lop-sided from the beginning; we can return to the matter of the athletic 
contests for this point.   
The account of the Isthmian Games, whatever we might say about Agesilaos‟ 
intervention, leaves a definite taste of Argive supremacy and πόιηο-dwelling Corinthian 
subservience – and this was the extent of Argive dominance while Sparta remained a 
nearby threat.  If the Nemean Games were held on schedule the next year, Xenophon‟s 
silence about them strongly suggests that they occurred without any distinctive or 
controversial features such as, for example, the presence of Corinthians among the 
hellanodikai or other administrators of the games.  The Corinthians never took a role in 
the Nemean Games; the Argives chaired the Isthmian Games even when no πνιηηεία 
arrangements seem to have been in place.  This is far too imbalanced to support any kind 
of ζπκπνιηηεία arrangement.  So (9) cannot fit, at the very least through 389 and probably 
throughout the Union, unless the ζπκπνιηηεία was reached later than there were any 
games left to hold, which also feels unconvincing. 
(14) presents possibilities previously unexplored by commentators on the Union.  
What if Corinth had become a (very large and heavily populated) θώκε of Argos?  It 
would retain those of its own local political institutions required to maintain the ἄζηπ, as 
well as its ability to make such laws for itself as pertained directly to the functioning of 
the ἄζηπ and not to those matters in which Argos would be able to assert its direct 
involvement.  But it would lack a βνπιή, depriving it of scope for independent action 
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against another πόιηο; its residents would not be able to continue calling themselves 
Corinthians in any way that would be exclusive of their larger Argive citizenship, though 
Corinth would remain a separate ἄζηπ from Argos; and it would not be expected to 
exercise control over the ρώξα outside of those tracts that were proper to the θώκε itself.  
The Argive garrison would still be an unusual feature of this arrangement, but rather less 
so considering the size, population, and recent history of the new θώκε.  The garrison 
would have been only a cautionary measure, and one which the πόιηο-dwelling 
Corinthians would greatly have appreciated in case another revolution were to arise.   
All of this fits together neatly, except for one point: as far as Xenophon was 
concerned, there was some entity in association with Corinth that could continue to be 
called a πόιηο, not just an ἄζηπ.  At any rate, given the size of Corinth, it would have 
been downright laughable if not insulting to the Corinthians ἐλ ηῇ πόιεη to call their ἄζηπ 
a θώκε, even if it had conceivably held the same status as a θώκε in relation to Argos.  
Theoretically, it would also have been able to maintain its own festivals and games, and 
here the Nemea-Kleonai-Argos relationship may be informative.  Whether we consider 
Kleonai a πόιηο or a θώκε, it held control of the Nemean Games, under Argive auspices, 
for 160 years; Argos emphatically denies the Corinthians ἐλ ηῇ πόιεη a commensurate 
right in regards to Isthmia.  Once again, the relationship appears to have been something 
more imbalanced than this. 
Nothing in Hansen‟s typology of dependent πόιεηο, then, can support the uniquely 
erratic set of relationships that we find between Corinth and Argos.  Argos was very 
clearly in control of everything that projected into the wider Greek world, namely 
command of territory and presidency of religious festivals (when not overpowered by an 
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outside party); and yet Corinth survived in some way as a πόιηο distinct from the πόιηο of 
Argos in contemporary parlance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION:  ARGOS, CORINTH, AND THE ABSTRACT πόλις 
 The Union of Corinth and Argos, as we said at the beginning of this study, was an 
anomaly.  Never before and never afterwards in Greek history had an attempt to 
amalgamate two πόιεηο gone so well and so poorly at the same time.  Territorially and 
militarily, it was an unquestionable success; socially, even, the ties that held together the 
Corinthians and Argives living in the Corinthia and the Argolid were psychologically 
strong enough to kill the desire to separate again in both parties when the terms of the 
Peace of Antalkidas were made known.  Politically, Corinth was protected from further 
internal strife by the Argive presence, but full unification was never actually achieved: 
too many distractions got in the way at the beginning for the movement to pick up 
enough steam to push ahead.  In the sphere that mattered most, the Union was a failure. 
 The rest of the Greek world knew this.  They never stopped associating the term 
πόιηο with Corinth, even when it had to all intents and purposes been subsumed into the 
Argive sphere of influence.  Something about the way in which Corinth continued to 
exist made it worthy of the term.  We are unable to define precisely what that something 
was.  Hansen and the CPC would offer the explanation that the term πόιηο can mean 
„territorial center,‟ or „town,‟ or „political hub,‟ or any combination of these meanings, 
and thus find a neat category into which the Corinth of 392-386 would fit.  As his 
taxonomies currently stand, however, there is no place to put the Union.  It is a curious 
feature of the CPC‟s published works, and perhaps a telling one, that the entire Union 
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goes so unnoticed as almost to have been deliberately ignored.  For an event as 
groundbreakingly inventive as this to be represented in its oeuvre by little more than a 
catalogue of uses of „πόιηο‟ in the Hellenika suggests that it has long been known that 
there is no room for the Union in the Copenhagen inn. 
 Does that mean that the Union violated the rules of πόιηο-ship?  We think we can 
say with confidence that its contemporaneous reporters did not believe that to be true.  
Does it mean that the existence of the Union is enough to overturn everything the CPC 
has done to determine the full range of meaning encapsulated in „πόιηο‟?  That would be 
too extreme: the Polis Project has opened up new ways of thinking about the πόιηο 
without which studies like this one would not have been possible.  Many of its findings, 
and particularly the reminders it regularly provides that ancient and modern statehood 
were very different concepts, will move the scholarly debate on the nature of the πόιηο 
forward for decades to come. 
Does it mean that the schemata of the CPC‟s studies are too rigid?  That it 
certainly does.  For all that it keeps reminding its readers that the πόιηο was an idea that 
the Greeks as a whole community innately understood in ways that we no longer can, its 
typologies, numbered lists, and impeccably-organized spreadsheets obscure the very fluid 
and perceptive nature of the πόιηο that it seeks to illuminate.  The Greeks did not think of 
the πόιηο as a permutation of territorial, administrative, and communitarian factors, nor 
did they gauge what sense of the term „πόιηο‟ they wanted to convey every time they 
used the word.  For them, „πόιηο‟ had a much simpler, and yet much subtler, meaning 
than anything the CPC‟s formulations can construct.  It was a meaning that supported 
both Sparta in all its political stability and Messenia in all its shifting statuses, and a great 
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many shades of gray in between.  It was a meaning that included the Union of Corinth 
and Argos in ways that permitted the Union to be thought of as one πόιηο and two πόιεηο 
at the same time.  The CPC has no room for that; but if we want to create a definition of 
„πόιηο‟ that most accurately reflects the ancient Greek perception of it, we must find a 
way to make room for it, or we will be stuck with a label that makes the ancient Greek 
system of political theory look far more disciplined than it was.  
50 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Accame, S. (1951).  Ricerche intorno alla guerre Corinzia.  Naples. 
Bearzot, C. (2004).  Federalismo e autonomia nelle Elleniche di Senofonte.  Milan. 
---------- and Landucci, F. (Eds.) (2006).  Argo: una democrazia diversa.  Milan. 
Berent, M. (2004).  In search of the Greek state: a rejoinder to M. H. Hansen.  Polis 21: 
107-146. 
Bordes, J. (1982).  Politeia dans la pensée grecque jusqu’à Aristote.  Paris. 
Coulson, W. and Kyrieleis, H. (Eds.). (1992).  Proceedings of an International 
Symposium on the Olympic Games, 5-9 September 1988.  Athens. 
Crowther, N. B. (2003).  Elis and Olympia: City, sanctuary, and politics.  In Phillips, D. 
J. and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2003).  Sport and Festival in the Ancient Greek World.  
Swansea, 61-73. 
Edwards, M. J. (Ed., comm..) (1995). Greek Orators IV.  Andocides.  Warminster. 
Finley, M. I. (1983).  Politics in the Ancient World.  Cambridge. 
---------- (1985).  Ancient History.  London. 
Gawantka, W. (1975). Isopolitie: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der zwischenstaatlichen 
Beziehungen in der griechischen Antike.  München. 
 Review by Ostwald, M. (1977) in AJP 98: 90-95. 
 Review by Rodewald, C. (1977) in JHS 97: 201-203. 
Gebhard, E. R. (1992).  The early stadium at Isthmia and the founding of the Isthmian 
Games.  In Coulson and Kyrieleis (1992), 73-80. 
di Gioia, N.  L‟unione Argo-Corinto.  In Sordi, M. (Ed.) (1974).  Contributi dell’Istituto 
di storia antica, Vol. 2: Propaganda e persuasione occulta nell’antichità.  Milan. 36-44. 
Green, P.  Appendix O: Selections from the Histories of Diodorus Siculus relevant to 
Xenophon‟s Hellenika.  In Strassler, R. B. (Ed.) (2009).  The Landmark Xenophon’s 
Hellenika.  New York. 420-494. 
Griffith, G. T. (1950).  The union of Corinth and Argos.  Historia 1: 236-256. 
Grote, G. (1869).  A History of Greece (Vol. 9).  London. 
51 
 
Hamilton, C. D. (1972).  The politics of revolution in Corinth, 395-386 B.C.  Historia 21: 
21-37. 
---------- (1979).  Sparta’s Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian 
War.  Ithaca. 
Hansen, M. H. (2006). Polis: an Introduction to the Ancient Greek City-state. Oxford. 
---------- (Ed.) (2007).  The return of the polis.  The use and meanings of the word Polis in 
Archaic and Classical sources.  Papers from the Copenhagen Polis Centre 8.  Stuttgart. 
---------- and Nielsen, T. H. (2004).  An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis.  
Oxford. 
Kagan, D. (1962).  Corinthian politics and the revolution of 392 B.C.  Historia 11: 447-
457. 
Larsen, J. A. O. (1968).  Greek Federal States: Their Institutions and History.  Oxford. 
Lewis, D. M. (1981).  The origins of the First Peloponnesian War.  In Shrimpton, G. S. 
and McCargar, D. J. (Eds.) (1981).  Classical Contributions: Studies in honour of 
Malcolm Francis McGregor.  Locust Valley.  71-78. 
Marchant, E. C. (Ed.) (1900).  Xenophontis Opera Omnia (Vol. 1: Historia Graeca).  
Oxford. 
---------- (Ed.) (1920).  Xenophontis Opera Omnia (Vol. 5: Opuscula).  Oxford. 
Meiggs, R. and Lewis, D. M. (Eds.) (Rev. 1988).  A Selection of Greek Historical 
Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.  Oxford. 
Meritt, B. D. (1931).  Greek Inscriptions, 1896-1927.  Corinth; results of excavations 
conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens; Vol. 8, Pt. 1.  
Cambridge, MA. 
Miller, S. G. (1992).  The stadium at Nemea and the Nemean Games.  In Coulson and 
Kyrieleis (1992), 81-86. 
---------- (2004a).  Ancient Greek Athletics.  New Haven. 
---------- (2004b).  Arete: Greek Sports from Ancient Sources, 3
rd
 ed.  Berkeley. 
Missiou, A. (1992).  The Subversive Oratory of Andokides: Politics, Ideology, and 
Decision-making in Democratic Athens.  Cambridge. 
52 
 
Molho, A., Raaflaub, K., and Emlen, J. (Eds.) (1991).  City-States in Classical Antiquity 
and Medieval Italy.  Stuttgart. 
Nielsen, T. H. (Ed.) (1997).  Yet More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis.  Papers from 
the Copenhagen Polis Centre 4.  Stuttgart. 
Nippel, W (1991).  Max Weber‟s “The City” revisited.  In Molho et al. (1991), 19-30. 
Oldfather, C. H. (Ed. and trans.) (1954).  Diodorus of Sicily VI: Books XIV-XV.19.  
Harvard. 
Raaflaub, K. (1991).  City-state, territory and empire in classical antiquity.  In Molho et 
al. (1991), 565-588. 
Rhodes, P. J.  Isopoliteia; Sympoliteia; Synoikismos. In Brill’s New Pauly (2002-).  
Leiden; Boston. 
Sakellariou, M. B. (1989).  The Polis-State: Definition and Origin. Meletemata 4.  
Athens. 
---------- and Faraklas, N. (1971).  Corinthia-Cleonaea.  Ancient Greek Cities 3.  Athens. 
Salmon, J. B. (1984).  Wealthy Corinth: A History of the City to 338 B.C.  Oxford. 
 Review by Cartledge, P. (1985) in CR 35: 115-117. 
Shipley, D. R. (1997).  A Commentary on Plutarch’s Life of Agesilaos: Response to 
Sources in the Presentation of Character.  Oxford. 
Sordi, M. (2006).  Atene e l‟unione fra Argo e Corinto.  In Bearzot and Landucci (2006), 
299-309. 
Thompson, W. E. (1986).  The stasis at Corinth.  SIFC
3
 4: 155-171. 
Tomlinson, R. A. (1972).  States and Cities of Ancient Greece: Argos and the Argolid. 
London. 
Tuplin, C. (1982).  The date of the union of Corinth and Argos.  CQ 32.1: 75-83. 
---------- (1993).  The Failings of Empire: A Reading of Xenophon Hellenica 2.3.11-
7.5.27. Stuttgart. 
Underhill, G. E. (1900).  A Commentary with Introduction and Appendix on the Hellenica 
of Xenophon.  Oxford. 
53 
 
Whitby, M. (1984).  The union of Corinth and Argos: a reconsideration.  Historia 33: 
295-308. 
